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Murray W eidenbaum is Mallinckrodt Distinguished University Professor and Director of the 
Center for the Study of American Business at Washington University in St. Louis. Mark 
Jensen is the Arthur and Jeanne Ansehl Fellow at the Center. This essay was written to serve 
as the introduction for a new printing of Berle and Means' The Modern Corporation and Pri-
vate Property to be published by Transaction Press. 
Introduction 
Berle and Means' monumental work on the corporation has become one of those enduring clas-
sics that many cite but few read. As would be expected, a current rereading reveals that much of the 
book has become a period piece. In part, its success has been its undoing. The initial reaction to its 
publication led a generation of researchers to answer questions raised in the book. Consequently, much 
of the field of study focusing on the corporate system has moved beyond the point at which lawyer 
Adolf Berle and economist Gardner Means wrote about it. 
Also, the economy has evolved. Who, writing in the depths of the Great Depression of the 
1930s, would have anticipated the double-digit inflation of the late 1970s? Nevertheless, this classic 
raises many of the fundamental questions that still beset those concerned both with the role of business 
in society and the governing power of the large corporation. In fact, the book is so rich with insights 
and thought-provoking analysis that, in this introductory essay, we can do little more than whet the 
reader's appetite, while simultaneously warning about the host of legal and statistical detail which is 
now mainly of historical interest. 
The Role of the Corporation 
The most enduring theme of The Modern Corporation and Private Property is the divorce of 
ownership from the control of the modern corporation. It is the view of the authors that, as a practical 
matter, stockholders have traded their legal position of private ownership for the role of recipient of 
capital returns (Book I, Chapter I). In addition, a close parallel is drawn between workers who surren-
der the direction over their labor and shareholders who become merely recipients of "the wages of cap-
ital. II 
Without using the term, Berle and Means show a keen awareness of the concern of modern 
"agency" theory: the interests of the directors and managers can diverge from those of the owners of 
the firm, and they often do so. This separation between ownership and control of a corporation through 
expanded ownership of the company creates what Berle and Means call the quasi-public corporation. 
The characteristics found in a quasi-public corporation are its tremendous size and its reliance on the 
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public market for capital. 
In Book I, Chapter IT, Berle and Means predict, on the basis of historical experience, that 
"practically all" economic activity will be carried on under this quasi-public corporate form. That fore-
cast has suffered from the rapid rise of the service sector of the economy. There, individual proprietor-
ships and partnerships remain widely used methods of organizing business activity, and dependence on 
organized capital markets is far less than in the case of the large corporation. 
Nevertheless, Berle and Means are closer to the mark than the more recent and widely circu-
lated projection in the late 1970s by Michael Jensen and William Meckling, that "The corporate form of 
organization is likely to disappear completely ... the larger corporations as we know them are destined 
to be destroyed. "1 
Given the effective separation of ownership from management, Berle and Means noted the 
likely characteristic increase in the size of the modern corporation and the concentration of the econ-
omy. However, two more recent developments should be kept in mind. As the authors properly per-
ceived in Book I, Chapter III, mergers and acquisitions are an important method of increasing corporate 
size. However, changes in corporate control can also lead to reducing the size of the company. An ex-
ample during the 1980s was the split up of Beatrice Foods into a variety of smaller companies, which 
occurred in connection with that $12 billion giant corporation going "private." 
A more basic criticism of the Berle and Means approach is that mergers among existing firms 
do not necessarily mean that the economy is becoming more "concentrated." In the dynamic industrial 
society that characterizes the United States, the rise of new companies overshadows the decline of the 
old. Thus, Berle and Means could accurately bemoan the demise of 49 of the largest 200 corporations 
within one decade. Yet we can celebrate the fortunes of many of today' s giants that are not on their list 
-- ffiM, Philip Morris, Boeing, United Technologies, Dow Chemical, Xerox, Pepsico, Digital Equip-
ment, Hewlett Packard, Sara Lee, Conagra, Unisys, Lockheed, Motorola, Monsanto, TRW, and Tex-
tron. Even Berle and Means would have to admit that this is an impressive array of "newcomers." 
Mergers and acquisitions continue to be an important force in maintaining a dynamic economy. 
In 1989 alone, 35 giant mergers occurred with an aggregate value of over $117 billion (see Table 1). 
Year 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
Source: 
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Table 1 
Mergers and Acquisitions Over $1 Billion, 
1982-1989 
Number 
of Deals 
10 
6 
19 
26 
31 
30 
42 
35 
Computed from Mergers and Acquisitions, various issues. 
Value 
($ millions) 
$19,440.3 
9,110.5 
55,178.5 
61,458.6 
67,932.4 
62,175.9 
96,399.4 
117,477.4 
At times, changes in control, or even threats of hostile takeovers, may serve to increase the efficiency 
and profitability of individual firms. 
The Management of the Corporation 
Berle and Means made a fundamental contribution in their analysis of the extent to which man-
agement of the modern corporation has been separated from its ownership. But they may have gone 
overboard in stating that the power and control has shifted away from the common stockholders (Book 
I, Chapter IV). Berle and Means state that this separation has totally eliminated the checks and balances 
that owners once exercised over management. With this undaunted power, management supposedly 
pursues its own interest, oblivious to the welfare of the owners. A contrary view has been developed in 
more recent years. According to Harold Demsetz, "In a world in which self-interest plays a significant 
role in economic behavior, it is foolish to believe that owners of valuable resources systematically re-
linquish control to managers who are not guided to serve their interest." 2 
As the reader might suspect, neither polar alternative accurately describes the complex reality 
of the world of corporate decision making. Top managements do possess significant discretion over the 
use of corporate resources. Merely consider the ability of the CEO of a major company to satisfy his 
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whims in terms of the selection of charities and pet causes that the organization will support. However, 
shareholders are not left powerless. Ample evidence is furnished by the proxy fights and takeover bat-
tles between different groups of owners grappling for control that, on occasion, brighten the financial 
pages of the daily newspapers. Clearly, the power of management is far from the absolute position that 
Berle and Means forecast. 
A fundamental development not foretold in The Modern Corporation and Private Property is 
the use by institutional investors of the latent powers they possess. Although Berle and Means were 
aware of the role of pension funds and insurance companies, they did not foresee either the growing 
importance of these investors or their desire to participate in corporate decision making. 
According to a Columbia Law School Institutional Investor Project, the top 20 pension funds in 
1989 owned 10.6 percent of General Motors common stock and 9.1 percent of mM. In addition, in-
stitutions owned at least one-half of the stock of 27 of the top 50 U.S. corporations and at least one-
third of 47 of the top 50. 
Peter Drucker has referred to this phenomenon as "pension fund socialism." The term may 
have been more prescient than he anticipated.3 The most activist role has been those of government 
pension funds. Thirteen of the top 20 pension funds are controlled by state or local governments. The 
top five state pension funds-- three from New York and two from California-- control $202 billion, or 
roughly 8 percent of total pension fund assets of $2.5 trillion~ 
By forming a Council of Institutional Investors, a group of managers of large state pension 
funds have created a mechanism whereby a small number of large shareholders (or rather their agents) 
can work together. In a few recent cases, some of the largest institutional investors, notably state gov-
ernment employee pension funds, have entered into specific takeover battles. In the case of the attempt 
in 1990 to take over Lockheed, several large institutional investors supported the management slate af-
ter gaining assurance that in the future they could name three members of the board of directors. 
In a broader sense, the increased activism of institutional investors is a response to the authors' 
concern about the euthanasia of the shareholder. 
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"The Control" of the Corporation 
Berle and Means vaguely define the concept of "the control" of the corporation. They refer to a 
subgroup of the stockholders who have the actual power of selecting the board of directors through any 
of the following ways: (1) complete ownership of common stock, (2) majority control, (3) legal de-
vices, (4) minority control, and (5) management control. The authors note in Book I, Chapters V and 
VI, that the interests of those in "control" differ from the profit-maximizing, risk-minimizing desires of 
the other owners and, as these interests move further apart, "the control" will ultimately lie in the hands 
of the management. Berle and Means provide an early and earthy statement of the agency problem: 
those who control the corporation, even if they own a large block of stock, "can serve their own 
pockets better by profiting at the expense of the company than by making profits for it. "5 This raises a 
serious question about the incentives for managers of the modem corporation to conduct business in ac-
cordance with the welfare of the owners. 
Boards of directors have responded to these concerns in a variety of ways. Granting key exec-
utives options to purchase the stock at some fixed price above the current market value provides them 
with a powerful incentive to maximize share performance. Bonuses in the form of stock ensure that the 
recipients, at least to some degree, will start to think like shareholders. Predictably, however, corpo-
rate activists (corporate critics would be a more accurate phrase) oppose these methods of compensation 
whenever the issue is presented at a corporate annual meeting. Yet shareholder approval is over-
whelming in virtually all cases. 
Nevertheless, many serious analysts of the corporation contend that the normal incentives de-
scribed above are not sufficient. They write favorably about "leveraged buyouts" and "going private," 
methods of increasing the ownership position of management by an order of magnitude. If these types 
of responses to the fundamental issues raised by Berle and Means became more widespread, they would 
make the corporation a less attractive place for many private investors who have no interest in 
"controlling" the affairs of the company whose stock-- or bonds-- they buy. 
The Position of the Shareholder 
Berle and Means bemoan the changed, more passive, role of the shareholder of the modern cor-
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poration. They note the extent to which the bondholder is superior, being guaranteed a fixed return on 
the funds invested in the corporation. In contrast, the stockholder is in a less desirable position, not 
knowing whether there will be any return at all on the investment (Book IT, Chapters VI-VITI). 
This portion of the book may have weathered least well. At the present time, we hear so often 
of the bondholders who have suffered an erosion of the market value of the principal because the man-
agers have so highly leveraged the firm. Typically, this has been done by issuing high-yielding but 
very risky "junk bonds." 
Even in more stable corporate relationships, stockholders can receive benefits not available to 
bondholders, notably participating in the growth of the firm. Writing in the Great Depression of the 
1930s, Berle and Means could not envision the rapid inflation of the post-World War IT period, when 
stocks became a major hedge against the erosion of real value. At the same time, bondholders often ex-
perienced serious declines in the market value of their portfolios, even when the nominal value of their 
assets and income streams remained unimpaired. 
Stock Exchanges and Stock Markets 
Berle and Means considered the listing of corporate shares on a stock exchange and the resul-
tant open market for these securities as essential to, and as a product of, the rise of the modern corpo-
ration. In their view, dispersed shareholders have exchanged control for liquidity. 
The authors discuss the many possible mechanisms that the directors possess in affecting the as-
set value of the stock or the distribution of company earnings (Book IT, Chapters IT and Til). Based on 
the imperfections of normal judicial protection of shareholder rights, The Modern Corporation and Pri-
vate Property presents the case for substantial regulation of security markets (Book II). 
As we have seen in the more than half century since its publication, such protection can be ex-
ercised by both private-sector and public-sector institutions. Thus, the private New York Stock Ex-
change (NYSE) determines many "rules of the game," and, according to the authors, makes "slow but 
steady progress" in ensuring the availability of securities at their market value to all potential investors. 
Furthermore, it is the NYSE that requires all listed companies to set up audit committees staffed en-
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tirely by outside directors. Simultaneously, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission plays the 
role of "cop on the beat," to ensure an adequate flow of information to the prospective purchasers and 
current owners of corporate shares. 
The prescience of the authors is especially evident in Book ill, Chapter ill, where they describe 
the problem of insider information. They state that the legal system can only choose randomly of the 
many unethical acts committed in securities markets and occasionally settle on one special case on 
which to act upon. However, Berle and Means reach a conclusion more optimistic than experience to 
date can justify: "As the standards of disclosure of corporate affairs become more exacting, the 
problem of the directors and managers in the market will become increasingly less important. n6 
Without defending the unethical practices of such slick operators as Ivan Boesky, the fact is that 
in 1990 no legal definition of insider trading exists to guide the honest market participant who wants to 
obey the law. Instead, legal advisers can only provide examples of the kinds of behavior that have re-
sulted in government prosecution and those that have not. 
Corporate Responsibility 
For whose benefit does the corporation operate? Book IV, Chapter I, raises this fundamental 
issue. The traditional legal answer is that the corporation is conducted for the benefit of the owners. 
Berle and Means view corporate responsibility to shareholders in the sense of "equitable control" where 
managers, having obtained power from the dispersed group of stockholders, act in the best interest of 
the owners of the firm. The authors then question this by analyzing the profit incentive to the execu-
tives. According to the authors, executives have such an "insignificant" fraction of traditional property 
rights that the incentive of profits is not strong enough to insure that they will make effective use of 
corporate property. 
The large degree of managerial discretion over corporate resources is borne out by a variety of 
case studies. Researchers at the Harvard Business School reported that none of the top executives of 
twelve successful American companies was very concerned about the market value of the company's 
stock. One chief executive stated this position very forcefully: 
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The highest priority with me is perpetuation of the enterprise. I'd like to leave this 
joint in better shape than when someone passed me the baton. I ~ve to take care of the 
shareholders in this, but I don't sweat the shareholders too much. 
Over the years, a far broader defmition of the responsibility - some call it the social responsi-
bility - of the corporation has developed. In an influential and widely cited report on the subject, the 
Committee for Economic Development (CED) describes the professional manager as a "trustee" bal-
ancing the interests of many diverse participants and constituents in the enterprise, including customers, 
employees, suppliers, and the community. Shareholders are listed only as one among those worthy 
groups -- and they are listed last. 
It turns out that the CED statement is not too different from the description provided in The 
Modern Corporation and Private Property: "New responsibilities towards the owners, the workers, the 
consumers, and the State thus rests upon the shoulders of those in control ... s 
Berle and Means contended that the divorce of ownership from management destroyed the tra-
ditional belief that profit maximization will drive the corporation to most efficiently use its assets (Book 
IV, Chapter II). In good measure, the wave of hostile takeovers in the late 1980s was a response to 
managers who paid insufficient attention to the concerns of the shareholders. Too many chief execu-
tives focused on the theater and opera as the epitome of a corporation's responsibility to society. They 
seemed to forget that a business is an economic institution, designed to provide goods and services for 
consumers in order to benefit the stockholders. 
Berle and Means forecast that, as the size of the corporation and the number of holders of its 
stock grew, a point would be reached where "the control" would be held by a self-perpetuating board of 
directors. Since the judicial process (along with the authors' understanding) is unable to deal with intri-
cacies and vagaries of corporate "control," the authors saw no way that laws would be established to 
prevent such situations from occurring. Hence, the fiduciary role of the corporate board of directors 
(Book II, Chapter V) deserves continuous attention and needs to be updated from the rather simple view 
held by Berle and Means. 
Both in legal theory and business practice, the board is the link between the shareholders who 
own the enterprise and the executives who manage it. Until the past decade or two, the senior execu-
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tives of the enterprise often comprised the majority of the typical corporate board, with the firm's attor-
neys and bankers (commercial and investment) serving as outside directors, together with important 
customers and political figures in the locality in which the company maintained its headquarters. 
In recent years, however, most of the boards of the larger companies consist primarily of out-
side (non-management) directors, most of whom at least nominally are independent of the management. 
However, the chief executive (CEO) usually serves as chairman of the board, setting the agenda for 
meetings and presiding over the deliberations. 
Currently, the boards of directors of about 60 percent of the larger corporations have set up 
nominating committees to propose both candidates for the board and senior officers of the company. 
These committees usually have a strong majority of outside directors, typically four out of five. How-
ever, these statistics do little to illuminate the continuing powerful role of the chief executive in initiat-
ing or approving committee selections. In practice, approximately 80 percent of outside directors are 
chosen by the chairman/chief executive, who usually exercises an effective veto over the other selec-
tions. 
Under the circumstances, many critics charge that the typical director acts as a rubber stamp, 
quickly approving the recommendations of the chairman/CEO. Although this charge does not lack sub-
stance, reality is far more complicated. Virtually all modern authorities on corporate governance agree 
that in times of crisis the board, led by the outside directors, exercises its powers, usually to the acclaim 
of impartial observers. However, short of emergencies, the board is reluctant-- and finds it difficult--
to override the recommendations of the management. 
In their 1989 study of corporate boards, Jay W. Lorsch and Elizabeth Maciver report a widely 
held view of directors, " ... to advise the management ... he can't do much more than that. "9 There 
are many reasons for that situation, several altogether sensible. The management knows more about the 
details of the company's operations than the outside directors and there is a natural tendency to defer to 
the inside directors. More fundamentally, a committee can set policy but it cannot run an organization, 
only one leader can. Hence, a wise board does not attempt to compete with the chairman/CEO, but 
views its role as primarily providing advice and counsel. 
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All that is correct. Nevertheless, there are occasions when the board should turn down the pro-
posals by the management because the interests of the shareholders dictate such action. Examples in-
clude a recommended acquisition which would unduly dilute the value of the stockholders' investment 
or a request by a strong division chief for a capital investment which would not likely yield a return ad-
equate to cover the cost of capital. 
Sad to report, it is the rare board that, under those circumstances, can say "no." On the posi-
tive side, wise CEOs informally review controversial proposals with key outside directors prior to for-
mal presentation to the board. Thus, they avoid situations where they force their boards to turn them 
down on important matters. Too frequently, however, the CEO/chairman simply dominates the board's 
decision making, even though independent outside directors constitute a clear majority. 
In Book IV, Chapter III, the authors return to analyzing the role of and the motivating influence 
on the professional manager. In more recent years, clear evidence has been developed on the motiva-
tions that comprise the driving force of modern corporations. Corporate managers are not fundamen-
tally different from other individuals, nor do they differ from those of the past. Self-interest does and 
should be expected to dominate their decision making. 
The same factors that encourage managers to be generous to themselves in allocating corporate 
resources can also be the driving force behind corporate acquisitions. After all, acquisitions do increase 
the amount of corporate resources in the winning management's span of control. Studies by the Con-
ference Board confirm with telling statistics what most people instinctively know: top executives in 
larger companies are paid more than their counterparts in smaller firms. Size of firm is the most com-
pelling factor. 
To be sure, profitability and other factors help to determine management pay and fringe bene-
fits. But, on average, the chief executive of a $10 billion company gets paid much more than the head 
of a firm whose yearly sales are only $5 billion.10 In plain English, the bigger the company, the larger 
the rewards to top management. The intangible management benefits from controlling large enterprises 
also are substantial. Being on the cover of Fortune or Business Week is a heady experience. 
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The Future of the Corporation 
Berle and Means wrote that the corporation as an institution may become not only an equal to 
the state, but even supersede it as the dominant social organization (Book IV, Chapter IV). From an 
economic viewpoint, they are correct. The privately owned corporation is the prevailing form of orga-
nizing the production and distribution of goods and services in the United States, and in other capitalist 
nations as well. The corporation is likely to continue playing this role for the indefinite future because, 
as the late Neil Jacoby stated, "There is simply no promising alternative way of organizing and carrying 
out most of the tasks of production." 11 
Moreover, the rise of political action committees with large budgets for political contributions 
has given many corporations direct access to powerful governmental decision makers. Also, the lack of 
geographic limits to the exercise of corporate power, a characteristic noted in passing by Berle and 
Means, has given rise to the multinational enterprise. Yet the contrast between government and busi-
ness powers remains striking. The largest company cannot tax us; the smallest unit of government can. 
The most profitable corporation cannot throw us in jail; the smallest municipality can. 
* * * 
A half century later, what can we say about Berle and Means' The Modern Corporation and 
Private Property? Despite its many specific shortcomings, the book remains a useful introduction to the 
internal organization of the corporation in modern society. The analysis by this unique combination of 
lawyer and economist is still relevant to exploring the relationship between the owners of the firm and 
its managers. 
To extend an old phrase, many of the answers provided by this book have been superseded by 
more recent events, but the questions raised continue to be worthy of the attention of scholar and prac-
titioner alike. 
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